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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Granting Petersen's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
After locating a large amount of cash in Petersen's trunk and subsequently 
finding marijuana during a search of the passenger compartment of his vehicle, 
the state charged Petersen with money laundering, attempted destruction of 
evidence, misdemeanor possession of marijuana and possession of 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.86-88, 201-203; Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.29, L 12.) Petersen 
moved for suppression of evidence claiming the "search and seizure and arrest 
by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification." (R., pp.98-99.) 
Petersen also filed a motion to dismiss the information charging him with money 
laundering and attempted destruction of evidence based on his claim that there 
was insufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to support a 
finding of probable cause. (R., pp.131-149.) The trial court granted his motion to 
suppress, finding there was no probable cause present to search the passenger 
compartment of Peterson's car. (R., p.219.) It also dismissed the money 
laundering charge, finding "no evidence, only mere speculation" of a violation of 
the money laundering statute. (R., p.225.) The state appealed, arguing that 
evidence that Petersen was trafficking in drugs provided probable cause to 
believe there was evidence of criminal behavior in the passenger compartment of 
Petersen's vehicle and that there was sufficient probable cause to believe 
Peterson committed the crime of money laundering. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-13.) 
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In response, Petersen initially argues the state has failed to provide an 
adequate record for review because the record does not establish this Court's 
jurisdiction or the preservation of the issues argued by the state on appeal. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.11-14.) Additionally, Petersen argues the trial court was 
correct in suppressing the evidence found in his car because law enforcement 
lacked probable cause. (Respondent's brief, pp.14-27.) In the alternative, he 
contends the district court erroneously rejected his claim officers improperly 
extended the duration of the traffic stop. (Id.) Petersen further argues the trial 
court's dismissal of the money laundering charge against Petersen should be 
affirmed because the only connection to the charged offense and any evidence 
supporting the charge was based on "mere speculation" of a "nebulous drug 
trafficking operation." (Respondent's brief, pp.27-34.) Review of the record and 
application of the correct legal standards show these arguments are without 
merit. 
B. The Record Supports This Court's Jurisdiction 
Petersen asserts this Court has no jurisdiction to hear his case. 
(Respondent's brief, p.12.) Petersen cites to Department of Health & Welfare v. 
John Doe I, 147 Idaho 314, 208 P.3d 296 (2009), for the proposition that "when 
the appellate record does not include the notice of appeal, the appellate court 
does not have jurisdiction to hear the case." (Respondent's brief, p.12.) In Doe 
!, the Court was "precluded from reviewing [the] case on the merits because a 
notice of appeal to th[e] Court was never filed." 147 Idaho at 316, 208 P.3d at 
298. Here, the state timely filed a timely notice of appeal with the Court. 
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Although not originally included in the record on appeal, a motion to augment has 
been filed contemporaneously with the filing of this reply brief. Appellate 
jurisdiction was established by filing a notice of appeal timely from the district 
court's order granting suppression and dismissal. 
C. Petersen's Claim That The State Failed To Preserve Issues Below For 
Appeal Is Without Merit 
Petersen also asserts the state has failed to provide an adequate record 
on appeal establishing it properly preserved the issues asserted on appeal. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.12-14.) This argument fails because Petersen raised the 
issues with his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss and the district court 
directly decided it. Petersen's argument is essentially that the state failed to 
place on the record an exception to the court's ruling, which has not been 
necessary to preserve an appellate issue in Idaho for decades. 
It is basic appellate law that issues actually decided by the trial court are 
reviewable on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 
(1998). In addition, although issues must generally be raised before the trial 
court to be preserved for appellate review, there is no requirement that the party 
taking the appeal be the party to raise the issue. See State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 
843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (allowing one party to seek review of issue 
raised by opposing party in intermediate appeal). Thus, Petersen's claim that the 
questions of whether the search of his vehicle was justified by an exception to 
the warrant requirement and if the charge of money laundering had been 
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supported by probable cause as to each element were not preserved is valid only 
if the court did not decide those question and he did not himself raise it. 
The state presented argument before district court after Petersen raised 
the issues of whether the search of Petersen's vehicle was valid and if there was 
sufficient information to support the charges against him and the court decided 
the issues raised by Petersen. (R., pp. 200-230.) 
Petersen's argument that the state must be the party that preserved the 
very issues he raised in his motion and that were decided by the court is 
essentially an argument that the state failed to put on the record an exception to 
the court's ruling. See Lyon v. Melgard, 66 Idaho 599, 602, 163 P.2d 1019, 1020 
(1945) (court "precluded" from considering or passing on rulings made by lower 
court where "no exception was taken to these rulings"). Such is not currently the 
law in Idaho. See I.R.C.P. 7(c), 46; State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 
871, 873 (1992) (appellate court may consider issues raised to trail court); State 
v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378,387,630 P.2d 665,674 (1981) (same); State v. DuValt, 
131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) (matters actually decided by lower 
court may be reviewed on appeal). To the extent Petersen is requesting this 
Court to hold that an issue raised by one party and decided by the court is not 
preserved unless the other party specifically notes an exception to the ruling, the 
state requests this Court to reject such a request. 
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D. The District Court Erred When It Granted Petersen's Motion To Suppress 
As discussed in the Appellant's brief, the "automobile exception" to the 
warrant requirement allows the police to search a vehicle without a warrant when 
there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of 
a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. 
Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). The analysis of 
whether an officer had probable cause for an automobile search is whether, 
based on the objective facts, a magistrate would have issued a warrant under 
similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Determining the existence of probable cause is "a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances ... , there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found .... " Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause does not require an actual 
showing of criminal activity, but only the "probability or substantial chance" of 
such activity. kt at 244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that 
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). The 
facts known to the officers must be judged in accordance with "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
"If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal 
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activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 
572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence 
might be found." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009). 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, there was probable cause to 
believe incriminating evidence of money laundering and/or drug trafficking would 
be found in Petersen's car based on the discovery of the large amount of money 
in Petersen's trunk when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances 
present to the officers before and during the traffic stop of Petersen. (R., p.219.) 
The totality of the circumstances need not point to the existence of evidence of a 
specific crime, State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 601, 237 P.3.d 1222, 1227 (Ct. 
App. 2010), and officers here had sufficient reason to believe evidence of a crime 
would be found in the passenger compartment of Peterson's car. The possible 
indicators of criminal activity included: Petersen's hands were shaking "quite 
noticeably" (Tr., p.19, Ls.17-18), there was a half-empty 12-pack container of 
Diet Pepsi on the passenger seat next to Petersen (Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.10), 
the officer saw two cell phones on the passenger seat (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-13), and 
there an air freshener in the center console of the clean car (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-18). 
Testimony of the officer was that taken alone, none of the above observations 
were necessarily of concern, however, 
when you are seeing that, the way the vehicle was set up, the 
nervousness, and the body indicators, and take all the totally [sic] of 
the circumstances, and put them into one, you start to develop 
reasonable suspicion that something else is going on other than 
this person is being pulled over for a traffic stop. 
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(Tr., p.22., Ls.15-20.) Additionally, the car Petersen was driving was newly 
registered and Petersen was on his way to his second trip to Seattle from 
Minnesota by way of Montana to meet a "lady friend of his." (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-23.) 
Pursuant to a valid consent search, officers discovered a large sum of money in 
a grocery bag inside of a duffle bag located in the trunk, bundled in a manner 
consistent with the bundling of drug proceeds. (Tr., p.27, Ls.7-16.) Although 
unemployed for the previous four years, Petersen claimed to always travel with 
that much cash and then remembered he was going to purchase a motor home 
in Seattle. (Tr., p.27, L.21 - p.28, L.10.) He also claimed to have so much cash 
on hand because he previously owned a used car dealership that dealt in cash, 
despite his previous acknowledgment of being unemployed for the past four 
years. (Tr., p.30, Ls.19-23.) 
Because there was probable cause to believe there was evidence of 
criminal behavior in the passenger compartment of Petersen's vehicle, the district 
court erred in granting his motion to suppress. 
E. Petersen Has Not Established His Alternative Claim That The District 
Court Erred In Rejecting His Claim That Officers Improperly Extended The 
Duration Of The Traffic Stop 
Petersen asserts in his reply brief that if the Court agrees with the state's 
position that there was probable cause, the suppression order should be affirmed 
on the alternative basis that the "officers unreasonably prolonged their detention 
of Mr. Petersen." (Respondent's brief, p.20.) The district court considered 
Petersen's arguments on this point below and correctly concluded "a reasonable 
person would have believed he or she was at liberty to ignore the police 
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presence and go about his or her business once the officers terminated their 
questioning, returned Defendant's documentation, and asked if he was good to 
go." (R., p.215 (footnote excluded).) Petersen has failed to show otherwise. 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate 
court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts." State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power 
to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives 
deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial 
evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. 
Const. Amend. IV. While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), because a traffic stop is more similar to an investigative detention than a 
custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts 
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which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be 
engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). An 
investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion must not only be justified 
at its beginning, but must be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. 
"The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the 
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion 
of criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139 
Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious 
circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the 
stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). 
"The officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop 
may-and often do-give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry 
and further investigation by an officer." kl 
"A detention may evolve into a consensual encounter where the officer 
returns the driver's license and other documents and engages in any subsequent 
questioning without further show of authority, which would convey a message 
that the individual is not free to leave." State v. Huffstutler, 145 Idaho 261, _, 
178 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2006). In this case, the district court concluded the 
stop was not in fact extended but turned into a consensual encounter once the 
officer "returned [Petersen's] license and accompanying information, and also 
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asked [Petersen] if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.215.) The trial court found 
Petersen did think he was free to go, "clearly evidenced by the fact that he 
acknowledged that he was good to go, shook the officer's [sic] hands, and began 
to leave before the officers reinitiated questioning." (Id.) 
Petersen has failed to show that the district court erred by declining to 
conclude the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop when it held "a 
reasonable person would have believed he or she was at liberty to ignore the 
police presence and go about his or her business" had they been in Petersen's 
position. 
F. The District Court Erred When It Granted Petersen's Motion To Dismiss 
Petersen next contends the evidence presented by the state to support a 
charge of money laundering was insufficient and based on speculation of a 
"nebulous drug trafficking operation." (Respondent's brief, p.35.) As discussed 
in the state's opening brief on appeal, the preliminary hearing testimony shows 
otherwise. 
The police found a duffel bag in Petersen's trunk containing a grocery 
sack with thousand dollar stacks of money wrapped in rubber bands in a manner 
consistent with how drug dealers wrap their money. (PH Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, 
L.16.) The undocumented money was "suspicious" (PH Tr., p.12, Ls.17-24), and 
although Peterson indicated there was $55,000 in the grocery bag (PH Tr., p.12, 
L.10), there was actually over $72,000 (PH Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23). Petersen stated 
he had not had a job for the previous four years, yet also stated he "travels with 
that much cash all the time." (PH Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19.) Petersen belatedly 
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explained he "was going to Seattle to buy a motor home." (PH Tr., p.13, Ls.4-6.) 
Seattle, however, is known as a "major distributor of marijuana" (PH Tr., p.27, 
Ls.18-19) and it is common for someone from the east to buy drugs cheap on the 
west coast and take them back to make a "big profit" (PH Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.29, 
L.5). Additionally, in Petersen's vehicle were a small amount of marijuana (PH 
Tr., p.41, Ls.8-19), a receipt for the purchase of over $400 worth of fertilizers and 
growing methods from a store in Minneapolis, Minnesota (PH Tr., p.61, L.8 -
p.62, L.6), and a diagram on how to grow marijuana (PH Tr., p.60, Ls.14-15). 
The car showed a recent temporary registration out of Montana although 
Petersen was from Minnesota and his vehicle odometer showed a high mileage 
since the registration. (Tr., p.56, Ls.8 - p.57, L.1, p.62, L.24 - p. 63, L.2.) 
Although Petersen argues there was no evidence presented to establish 
Petersen was even aware of a connection between the money found in his trunk 
and "the alleged criminal enterprise" (Respondent's brief, p.34), intent may be 
inferred from the defendant's conduct or from circumstantial evidence. See 
State v. Pole, 79 P.3d 729 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 
P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, I.C. § 18-115 provides that "intent 
or intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding 
circumstances connected with the offense." The state was not required to prove 
the elements of money laundering beyond reasonable doubt at the preliminary 
hearing. Contrary to the district court's holding, it is reasonable to conclude, 
based on the evidence presented at preliminary, hearing that not only was 
Petersen concealing and/or transporting this large amount of undocumented 
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cash, but his purpose was to use the money to develop or continue operation of 
a drug trafficking enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence and dismissing count I of the information. 
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